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Capacity of Temperature-Based Covert Channels
Sebastian Zander, Philip Branch, and Grenville Armitage
Abstract—Covert channels aim to hide the existence of com-
munication. Recently, Murdoch proposed a temperature-based
covert channel where information is transmitted by remotely
inducing and measuring changes of temperature of an unwitting
intermediate host. The channel was invented for the purpose
of attacking anonymous servers, but could also be used for
general-purpose covert communications. We propose an empir-
ical method for estimating realistic (and previously unknown)
capacities for this channel. In example scenarios with different
intermediate hosts and different levels of temperature induction
and noise we find the channel capacity is up to 20.5 bits per
hour, but it almost halves to 10.3 bits per hour with higher noise
or more effective cooling at the intermediate host.
Index Terms—Network security, covert channels, capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENCRYPTION alone is not sufficient to secure communi-cation. Often the simple fact that communication exists
is enough to raise suspicion and take further actions. Covert
channels aim to hide the very existence of the communica-
tion [1]. Individuals and groups may have various reasons
to utilise covert channels, often motivated by the existence
of an adversarial relationship. Examples include government
agencies versus criminal organisations, hackers or corporate
spies versus company IT departments, or dissenting citizens
versus their governments.
Many network protocol covert channels have been proposed
[1]. Recently, Murdoch proposed a temperature-based covert
channel that transmits information by measuring remotely-
induced changes of temperature of an unwitting intermediate
host connected to a network [2]. Initially proposed to identify
servers hidden inside anonymisation networks (such as Tor)
[2], the channel can also be used for general-purpose covert
communications.
In temperature-based covert channels the covert sender (by
convention Alice) modulates the CPU load of an unwitting
intermediate host connected to a network (e.g. public server)
by varying the rate of requests sent to it based on the covert
bits to be sent. The change in CPU load changes the tem-
perature, which in turn changes the skew of the intermediate
host’s clock. The covert receiver (by convention Bob) probes
the intermediate host’s clock and recovers the covert bits by
estimating the clock-skew changes [2].
Two scenarios are possible. In the first scenario the in-
termediate host is separated from both Alice and Bob by a
network (see Fig. 1). Alice and Bob could be controlled by
the same person (e.g. attacking Tor hidden services) or by
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Fig. 1. Temperature-based covert channel where Alice and Bob are separated
from the intermediate host by a network.
different persons (e.g. general hidden communication). In the
second scenario Alice is located on the intermediate host and
manipulates the CPU load directly. Only Bob is separated from
the intermediate host by a network. This is a likely scenario
for the ex-filtration of sensitive information.
The usefulness or threat of the channel (according to one’s
perspective) depends on the channel capacity, which is the
maximum transmission rate at which error-free communi-
cation is possible [3]. We propose, and describe first, an
empirical method to estimate the channel capacity. Then we
analyse the capacity in some example scenarios depending
on different levels of load inducement and channel noise and
different intermediate hosts. With an intermediate host similar
to the one in [2] and low noise the capacity is 20.5 bits per
hour (bph), but it almost halves to 10.3 bph with higher noise
or with similar noise but different intermediate host with more
effective cooling. An online technical report provides further
details of our work [4].
II. METHODOLOGY
Ambient temperature and humidity vary over time affecting
the measured clock skew [2]. However, ambient changes
usually happen on longer timescales and it is possible to
remove these long-term trends from the clock skew output.
With this our system is time-invariant as the output depends
only on the input and additive noise. The channel suffers
from multiple independent sources of noise, and our empirical
measurements confirm the noise is approximately Gaussian.
Thus we model the channel as an Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN) channel [3]. The channel capacity is:







where 𝐵 is the bandwidth of the channel and 𝑃/𝑁 is the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the average signal power divided
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Simulink model AWGN channel
Fig. 2. Model of the temperature-based covert channel.
by the average noise power. Figure 2 shows our overall system
model. The input of the AWGN channel is a clock skew signal
generated by Alice 𝑠S (𝑡). The output of the channel 𝑟 (𝑡) is
the clock skew signal measured by Bob plus the noise 𝑛 (𝑡).
But Alice can only indirectly manipulate 𝑠S (𝑡) by modulat-
ing CPU load 𝑠L (𝑡). To model the relationship between 𝑠L (𝑡)
and 𝑠S (𝑡) through changes of temperature 𝑠T (𝑡) we created
a Matlab Simulink [5] model. The model allows simulating
a frequency sweep to estimate the channel’s bandwidth. This
reduces the number of testbed experiments drastically, as only
a few experiments are needed to calibrate the model. We also
use the model to estimate the signal power. We investigate
the effects of different CPU load inducement and different
intermediate hosts on the bandwidth and signal power.
The noise 𝑛 (𝑡) includes noise introduced by the clock skew
estimation (network jitter and timestamp quantisation noise
[6]) as well as noise because of CPU load or temperature
fluctuations. We estimate the noise power for a particular in-
termediate host from empirical measurements of 𝑟 (𝑡) without
any input signal 𝑠S (𝑡). We measure the noise during day and
night and for different amounts of background CPU load (load
not caused by Alice).
Timestamp quantisation noise was minimised by using the
improved clock skew estimation technique from [6]. As in [2]
we assume relatively ideal network and ambient conditions.
Our testbed was small and only lightly utilised and hence net-
work jitter was small. Ambient temperature/humidity changes
were also small, as all PCs were located in air-conditioned
rooms. Therefore, our results represent upper bounds for
scenarios with “worse” conditions. However, even on long un-
congested paths through the Internet jitter is typically skewed
towards low values [6] and usable intermediate hosts (servers)
are often in air-conditioned rooms.
III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. Testbed Experiments
The first intermediate host (IH1) was a 2.4GHz Intel
Celeron CPU inside a midi-tower case running Linux 2.6 with
CPU fan running at constant speed. The second intermediate
host (IH2) was a 2.8GHz Intel Pentium CPU inside a desktop
case running FreeBSD 4.10 with a more effective thermally-
controlled CPU fan. Alice introduced CPU load locally using
the load generator cpuburn [7] (IH1 and IH2) or remotely by
repeatedly fetching a small static web page from an Apache
2.2.3 web server with Secure Socket Layer (SSL) enabled
(IH1 only). The number of web requests sent per second was
approximately Poisson-distributed; in the following we report
the mean values only. Bob probed the TCP clock [2] of IH1
and IH2 with an average frequency of 1 Hz.
Firstly, for calibrating the Simulink model we generated
periodic square wave signals of CPU load and remotely





















Fig. 3. Comparison of normalised clock-skew output of Simulink model
and empirical measurements for intermediate host 1 with remote web request
load inducement.
measured the resulting clock-skew changes. Each period of the
periodic signal was a time of induced CPU load followed by
the same time without induced CPU load allowing the interme-
diates to cool down to their previously unloaded temperature.
We ran experiments with load-inducement times of 180, 300,
600, 1200, 1800 and 2400 seconds, each time generating ten
consecutive signal periods. The induced CPU load was ~100%
with cpuburn, but with an average of ~30 web requests per
second it only averaged ~69% (similar to experiments in [2]).
Secondly, we measured clock-skew changes without load
inducement (the noise), as well as the room and the inter-
mediate’s case temperature. We measured the noise when the
intermediate host was idle (~0% CPU load), lightly loaded
with an average of ~1 web request/second (average ~3% CPU
load) and more heavily loaded with an average of ~10 web
requests/second (average ~25% CPU load).
B. Simulink Model
We constructed a CPU-load-clock-skew simulation model
with Matlab Simulink [5]. The input of the model is CPU
load (ranging from 0 to 1) and the output is clock-skew (in
parts per million). The model’s parameters need to be fitted
based on the empirically measured behaviour of a particular
intermediate host (discussed above). While the model parame-
ters are specific for an intermediate host, we think the model’s
structure is more general. We applied it to two very different
intermediate hosts and in both cases the model output matches
the empirical data well [4]. Figure 3 compares the output of
the model and the measured clock skew for IH1 with web
request load (average over 10 signal periods).
C. Noise
During the day temperature changes inside the case were
not highly correlated with room temperature changes. This
is probably because the intermediate hosts were in close
proximity to other PCs that were actively used during the
day. During the night when these other PCs were idle, the
case temperature followed the room temperature trend very
closely. From the measured clock-skew series we computed a
smoothed series which we then subtracted from the original
series to obtain a detrended series [4].









































































































Fig. 4. Quantile-quantile plot of detrended variable clock skew for idle
intermediate host 1 during the day vs. Gaussian distribution.


























Fig. 5. Channel capacity based on signal-to-noise ratio for all three scenarios;
the points 𝐶Day and 𝐶Night depict the capacities given the empirical noise
during the day and night for each capacity curve and the points 𝐶Low and
𝐶High depict the capacities given the empirical noise caused by low rate and
high rate web traffic during the day.
We investigated whether the detrended noise fits a Gaussian
distribution. The Shapiro-Wilk statistical test of normality
indicated Gaussian distributions for IH1 but not for IH2 [4].
However, the test is sensitive to small deviations. Examin-
ing quantile-quantile plots of the detrended noise, we found
the empirical data always follows the quantile-quantile line
closely, except at the edges (e.g. Fig. 4) [4]. This indicates
that the empirical distributions are approximately Gaussian.
D. Channel Capacity
The temperature-based covert channel is a base-band chan-
nel acting as a low-pass filter on the input signal. The channel’s
bandwidth 𝐵 is given by the upper cut-off frequency, which
is the frequency where the output power has decreased by 3
decibel (dB). We estimated 𝐵 by simulating different signal
frequencies with the Simulink model and identifying when
the power has decreased by 3 dB for the three scenarios: 1)
IH1 with cpuburn, 2) IH1 with web requests and 3) IH2 with
cpuburn. Figure 5 shows the capacity curves computed using
Equation 1 depending on the SNR in dB for all three scenarios
(𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3). For larger SNRs the capacity increases almost
linearly with the SNR. However, the signal power is limited
and hence the capacity cannot increase to infinity given a
certain noise level.
We estimated the average power of signal and noise by
computing the power spectral density (power per frequency
band), integrating over all frequency bands within 𝐵 and
normalising the result based on the number of samples of
the signal. For each scenario we computed the average signal
power based on the Simulink model’s output for alternating
square wave CPU load with a frequency equal to 𝐵. Similarly,
for each scenario we computed the average noise power from
the empirical detrended noise signals. Figure 5 shows the
capacities 𝐶Day and 𝐶Night for the SNRs during day and night
on all three capacity curves as well as 𝐶Low and 𝐶High for the
SNRs with noise caused by low and high rate web requests
(scenario 2 only).
As expected, the SNR is higher during the night and
the SNR decreases with increasing background load of the
web server. The capacity is about 20.5 bph for IH1 with
maximum signal power (cpuburn) and minimum noise (idle
during night). Remote load inducement with minimum noise
(idle during night) reduces that capacity to only 18.3 bph,
but with increasing background server load it reduces to
10.3 bph. IH2 with much more effective cooling decreases the
capacity significantly to 16.1 bph (idle during night). Overall,
our capacity estimates are significantly higher than the very
rough ad-hoc estimate of 2–8 bph [2].
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a method for estimating the capacity of
Murdoch’s temperature-based covert channel [2]. With an
intermediate host similar to the one in [2] and low noise
the capacity is 20.5 bph, but it almost halves to 10.3 bph
with higher noise or with an intermediate host with more
effective cooling. In future work we aim to examine a larger
number of different intermediate hosts and compare their
channel capacities. We also plan to use our Simulink model
in combination with the Matlab Simulink communications
toolbox [5] to measure the actual throughput of the channel
depending on different encoding schemes.
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